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THE LEGALITY AND UTILITY OF THE
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BYLAW
Jonathan R. Macey*
The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the
agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.
INTRODUCTION
The vitality of the takeover market is approaching a critical junc-
ture. Certain incumbent management teams and their lawyers and lobby-
ists have convinced a passel of state legislatures and state judges to try
to kill the market for corporate control. With the rise of the poison pill
and the "just say no" defense, the outlook has not looked so bleak for
takeovers since the collapse of Drexel Burnham in the 1980s killed the
junk bond market and with it the ability to finance major league acqui-
sitions. Delaware courts, for example, have validated the poison pill2
and seem to be reluctant to restrain its use even in the most egregious
* J. DuPratt white Professor of Law and Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and Eco-
nomics, Cornell Law School. Andrew Stone, Cornell Law School class of 2000, provided valuable
research assistance.
1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that the
courts would scrutinize a board attempting to interfere with the shareholder voting process during
a contest for corporate control and that, in such situations, the business judgment rule would not
apply in full force).
2. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
HeinOnline -- 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 835 1997-1998
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
circumstances Nevertheless, after a brief respite, takeovers have made
a modest comeback in the early 1990s.
Just as lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the inven-
tion of the poison pill, lawyers are about to revive it with another legal
invention. The invention is the "shareholder rights bylaw" and it prom-
ises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate
control.
Poison pills of companies with rights bylaws expire automatically
whenever there is an all-cash offer for one hundred percent of the com-
pany's stock at a price at least twenty-five percent above the market!
Once a bylaw is passed, the only way managers can keep their firm's
poison pill in place, once an offer is made, is by getting shareholder ap-
proval.6 Thus, the shareholder rights bylaw neither inhibits the initial
adoption of a poison pill nor prevents the shareholders from approving
continuation of a poison pill when they determine that it is the best
means for increasing shareholder value. Instead, it merely provides
shareholders with a mechanism for policing management, allowing
them to ensure that management prerogatives are not placed above the
best interests of the shareholders.
The advantage currently enjoyed by incumbent management in the
takeover wars is due to legal acceptance of the poison pill. Often, target
management uses the pill to thwart outside bids even when target firm
shareholders want to sell out. Poison pills chill takeovers by giving tar-
get shareholders the right to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars of
additional shares at fire sale prices when there is a takeover attempt.
These rights make takeovers impossibly expensive. The pills stay in
place until target company directors agree to nullify or "rescind" them.7
Poison pills were originally intended to slow down takeovers,
thereby allowing the board of directors to fully consider a bid, seek
other bidders, or negotiate superior terms for the shareholders. In other
words, the pill was originally intended to act as a means for allowing the
3. See MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FNANCE 162 (1994).
4. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylmv Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the
Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605 (1997) (analyzing shareholder
power to constrain management from resisting corporate control contests through bylaw amend-
ments). For examples of recent anti-antitakeover actions involving shareholder rights bylaws, see
INST1TrrIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, THE 1997 PROXY SEASON: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 25-26,
53-56 (1997).
5. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 618.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 605.
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board to fulfill its responsibility of maximizing value for the sharehold-
ers. It was not "seen as a means for entrenched management teams to
thwart takeovers."8
Unfortunately, poison pills have become deal breakers. Courts
have become far too reluctant to second-guess directors who refuse to
eliminate their firms' pills. These courts are shirking their responsibility
to safeguard shareholder value by failing to enforce fiduciary duties and
by failing to police director and management conflicts of interest. Tar-
get firms can now keep their poison pills in place and "just say no" to
would-be acquirers, regardless of the market premiums these acquirers
are willing to pay to shareholders. Once management's use of the poi-
son pill is accepted under the power of the business judgment rule,
courts have little evaluative say over the way in which it is used or over
the decision of whether it will be pulled.9
The shareholder rights bylaw eliminates the ability of target com-
pany boards of directors to thwart changes of control by keeping their
poison pill defensive devices in place once an outside bid has been
made. The technique is simple. A shareholder proposes an amendment
to the firm's bylaws that requires the company's poison pill (and other
defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives
an all cash offer for one hundred percent of the firm's stock at a price at
least twenty-five percent above the market. The only way the firm can
keep its poison pill is if the shareholders vote to keep the pill after re-
ceiving the offer.
But just as there were considerable initial doubts about the legality
of the poison pill, so too are there some who claim that the shareholder
rights bylaw is not legal. But these doubts are misplaced. From a legal
perspective, the shareholder rights bylaw is less troubling than the poi-
son pills. These bylaws do not encroach on directors' prerogatives to
nearly the same extent as poison pills encroach on shareholder rights.
Concerns about the legality of the shareholder rights bylaw center
on the applications of state statutory provisions separating ownership
and control and giving boards of directors the power to manage or direct
the management of a firm. If shareholder rights bylaws infringe too
much on boards of directors' power to run companies, they will be de-
clared illegal. But they do not so infringe for three reasons. First, share-
holder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's respon-
8. Andrew Osterland, Popping Pills, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 21, 1996, at 36,37.
9. See ROE, supra note 3, at 166. But see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
659-61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing the reasons for not applying the business judgment rule with
full force in shareholder voting contexts).
1998]
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sibility to manage the firm so as to maximize shareholder value. Sec-
ond, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the spe-
cific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation. The shareholder rights
bylaw is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to
shareholders. Third, the adoption of shareholders rights bylaw does not
prevent the board of directors from advising shareholders to vote to re-
ject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving man-
agement the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison
pill. Instead, finding the shareholder rights bylaw legal merely protects
the contractual relationship between investors and management and
prevents management from making unilateral decisions contrary to the
financial benefit of shareholders. Finally, due to the importance of a vi-
tal takeover market to effective corporate governance in the United
States, sound policy mandates that courts and legislatures support
shareholders in the assertion of their right to pass a shareholder rights
bylaw.
Part I discusses the character of the poison pill and the judicial
scrutiny of its use. Part I further discusses the ability for the poison pill
to be an effective mechanism for increasing shareholder value. Finally,
Part I discusses the abuses inherent when a board has the option of a
poison pill. Part II discusses some of the systematic concerns implicated
by the poison pill and shareholder rights bylaw conflict. First, it evalu-
ates the importance of the market for corporate control as an efficient
mechanism for monitoring management and the effects of the poison
pill on the vitality of that market. Second, it discusses the evidence
showing that jurisdictional competition is a strong force in encouraging
lawmakers to establish efficient rules. Thus, a jurisdiction which falls to
adapt its legal rules to changing circumstances-such as a jurisdiction
that invalidates the shareholder rights bylaw-will likely lose charters.
Part II analyzes the effectiveness of the shareholder rights bylaw in
diminishing some of the problems posed by the poison pill. And finally,
Part IV defends the legality of the rights bylaw under Delaware law.
The Article concludes that the shareholder rights bylaw can create effi-
cient outcomes or at least mitigate the inefficiencies of the poison pill;
can prevent management from entrenching itself in the face of a tender
offer, thereby diminishing the harm poison pills can do to the market for
corporate control; is a legal exercise under Delaware law; must be up-
held if a jurisdiction is to maintain its position in the market for corpo-
rate charters; and finally, leaves most of the positive effects of the poi-
son pill intact.
[Vol. 26:835
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I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE POISON PILL
A. Poison Pills and Their Judicial Validation
Poison pills emerged in the early 1980s as a means for deterring
hostile takeovers. Poison pills are often described as shareholder rights
plans because they entitle corporate shareholders to buy the corpora-
tion's stock at a large discount once the pill is triggered when a third
party acquires a certain percentage of the corporation's voting securi-
ties.' Once a pill is triggered, the dilution of the voting value of a po-
tential acquirer's stock significantly increases the cost to a bidder,
usually making a takeover prohibitively expensive unless the pill is re-
deemed. "
Although poison pills take a variety of forms, they all are designed
to create the same effect. Poison pills are instruments that, when trig-
gered, dilute the equity holdings of an unwanted bidder for a target
company by permitting the shareholders of the firm to increase their
equity holdings at a low cost. The target board creates a new class of
preferred stock with limited rights and distributes shares of that stock to
the common shareholders. 2 The board retains the option to redeem the
pill (the issued stock) for nominal consideration, thereby allowing the
board to approve a bid without necessarily prohibitively increasing the
cost of a takeover.
The poison pill encourages negotiations between a potential ac-
quirer and a target firm's management in order to maximize value. The
pill causes severe economic and voting dilution to the bidder. While
poison pills and other defensive measures increase the costs of take-
overs, concomitantly decreasing their attractiveness, they can increase
wealth when used efficiently. 3 Principally, the poison pill minimizes the
effects of coercion associated with tender offers where the shareholder
10. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA.
L. REV. 783,789-91 (1994).
11. See id. at 790.
12. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 574-75 (1986).
13. See Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 809. Loewenstein presents the following data:
In [1988] there were 198 tender offers in excess of $1 million each, with a total value of
almost $154 billion. Of these, fifty-nine, or thirty percent were contested.... By 1991,
the number of tender offers with a value in excess of $1 million had declined to twenty-
three, with a combined value of $14.2 billion. Of these, only four were contested and of
those four only one was completed.
1998]
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who does not accept a tender offer finds himself in an inferior position.'4
The court in Moran v. Household International, Inc.'5 held that a
target's board is authorized pursuant to Delaware law to install a share-
holder rights plan or poison pill. 16 Courts originally stated that the use of
defensive tactics such as the poison pill would be subject to enhanced
scrutiny. For example, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.17 set a two-
pronged proportionality test as the standard for review of defensive tac-
tics under Delaware law. First, the court stated that defensive measures
will be justified only if the target's board can demonstrate that, after
reasonable investigation, it determined in good faith that the potential
acquirer's offer posed a threat to the firm."8 Second, the board's re-
sponse must be proportional to the threat posed by the change in con-
trol. 9 If the board satisfies these two prongs, its action will be evaluated
under the business judgment rule.' ° Later decisions reveal that this sup-
posedly "enhanced" standard of review remains loose and that courts
are generally unwilling to police a board's use of the poison pill as an
entrenchment device.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,2' for example,
Paramount contended that Time was under an obligation to accept their
tender offer which they claimed to be superior to that of Warner, the
bidder ultimately successful in merging with Time. The Delaware Su-
preme Court rejected Paramount's claim, ultimately arguing that the en-
hanced business judgment rule merely requires that the board's action
be within the range of reasonableness. Corporate policies or plans that
might be interfered with from an offer constitute reasonable justifica-
tions for rejecting an offer, even if it clearly means sacrificing a signifi-
cant economic gain for the shareholders. 23 As Dennis Block and Jona-
than Hoff describe the holding:
[T]he court held that Unocal, as an enhancement of the business judg-
ment rule, is not limited to a mechanical comparison of the long-term
and short-term value of competing transactions ... but rather is a
14. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUs. LAW. 101, 113
(1979).
15. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
16. See id at 1353.
17. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
18. See id at 955.
19. See id
20. See id. at 958.
21. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
22. See id at 1142.
23. See id at 1153.
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flexible analytical tool for analyzing whether the board acted in good
faith and in an informed manner. 24
Later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,25 the Delaware
Supreme Court further described the test for analyzing a board's deci-
sion to reject a tender offer:
The ratio decidendi for the "range of reasonableness" standard is a
need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against
perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint.
Consequently, if the board of directors' defensive response is not dra-
conian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a "range of reasonable-
ness," a court must not substitute its judgment for the board's.26
Unitrin's holding seems to further widen the latitude within which
directors can act when faced with a hostile bid. Recently, in Moore
Corp. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc.,27 a federal district court inter-
preting Delaware law also determined that a board's rejection of an un-
solicited tender offer without offering any economic alternative ("just
say no") is justifiable. Boards are not obligated to obtain short-term
economic gains and particularly need not abandon a corporate strategy
to obtain such a gain.2'
B. Utility of Poison Pills
In a hypothetical world of costless shareholder monitoring (i.e.,
one in which the interests of shareholders and their manager-agents are
perfectly aligned), we begin by asking what the reaction of a firm's
majority shareholders would be to the purchase of a substantial minority
block of shares. The majority's response critically depends on whether
incumbents ("I") believe that the minority purchaser ("M") has assem-
24. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, 'Just Say No' and the 'Unocal' Test, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 5, 6. Randall Thomas described the Time decision as one that "may mark the
collapse of heightened judicial scrutiny for takeover defensive tactics against hostile tender offers
and a retreat to their deferential review under the business judgment rule." Randall S. Thomas,
Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46
VAND. L. REv. 503,517 (1993).
25. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
26. Id. at 1388 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d
34,45-46 (Del. 1994)).
27. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
28. See id at 1560; see also In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 62-
63 (Del. 1995) (holding that a board is not under an obligation to seek the highest value reasona-
bly available for shareholders when facing two active bidders).
1998]
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bled the block for passive investment purposes or as a springboard for a
future takeover bid.
The relation between the value of the firm under incumbent owner-
ship-management ("V1") and its prospective value under the owner-
ship-management of the current minority shareholder ("VM") dictates
whether a minority shareholder will find it advantageous to acquire
control or simply to remain an investor. If the value of the firm is
greater in the hands of the current management (Vi > VN1), the substan-
tial minority position will only be for purposes of investment; acquisi-
tion of the minority block has nothing to do with a corporate "raid." In
fact, many, if not most, acquisitions of substantial minority holdings are
made only for investment. By definition, as long as the minority holds
for investment only, the majority has no reason to expect it to make a
takeover bid.
In some cases, however, the value of the firm will be greater if
control is placed in the hands of the current minority (VM > V,). In these
circumstances, the minority stake may be acquired in contemplation of a
future tender offer. The acquisition of the minority holding thus pro-
vides a signal to the market, transmitting information that the firm's
shares are thought to be undervalued in the hands of incumbents relative
to their prospective value in the hands of others. Share prices begin to
rise in anticipation of a possible takeover.
The appropriate majority response under these circumstances inevi-
tably depends upon whether or not the majority shareholders believe
that the minority owner will offer the best price to obtain control and, if
a higher offer is predicted, what the cost of eliciting it will be. News
that the new minority holder contemplates a takeover alerts other po-
tential bidders that the firm may be undervalued. Incumbent manage-
ment realizes that these other bidders may decide that they value the
firm even more than the current minority and thus would be willing to
offer an even higher price. If a higher premium over current market
price can be obtained from some third party ("T"), net of the cost of
obtaining it, the majority shareholders will of course prefer to thwart the
takeover plans of the current minority in order to make way for an auc-
tion by other bidders and subsequent acquisition by a third party. 9
More formally, even if the firm would be worth more in the hands
of the new minority than in the hands of its current owners, its value if
owned and managed by a third party ("VT") may be even greater: (VT >
29. The fact that shareholders would want an auction after the takeover is threatened does
not mean that they would agree to allow auctions ex ante, or that auctions are necessarily efficient.
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VM > Vi). If so, it is efficient for a third party to obtain control, as this
places the firm's resources in the hands of their highest-valued user."
As explained below, a third party can acquire control in two ways. He
can either purchase the firm after the current minority owner completes
the contemplated takeover, or he can try to enter the bidding for the firm
at the first stage, competing with the minority holder in an auction for
control of the firm. Ignoring transaction costs, the highest-valuing party
will ultimately control the firm either way. But that does not mean that
incumbent shareholders are indifferent to the process. It is in the interest
of the incumbents to capture for themselves the largest possible share of
any gain from a change in control. With positive transaction costs, this
may be accomplished by having as many additional parties as possible
bid against M for control. T, as the highest-valuing bidder among them,
will be willing to offer the greatest premium, up to (VT - Vi). The pre-
mium of the current minority would be at most only (VM -Vi). So, in
light of positive transactions costs, the incumbents prefer selling di-
rectly to T, instead of selling to M, who then sells to T.
It is important to see exactly why incumbent shareholders might
not be able to sell their shares directly to the third party, even though T
would ultimately offer a greater premium than the current minority
shareholder, M. In the modem battle for corporate control of large,
publicly held firms, the principal weapon in the arsenal of the tender of-
feror is the two-tier or two-step bid.3" Typically, after a firm has ac-
quired a significant minority block of stock in another firm through
open-market purchases, it takes the first step by acquiring a controlling
interest in the target firm. In the second step, the bidding firm causes a
merger between itself (or a wholly owned subsidiary) and the target
firm.3 This merger eliminates the equity interests of the remaining
30. Takeovers themselves have been shown both theoretically and empirically to increase
the share prices of target firms. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1165-74 (1981)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 BUs. LAW. 1733, 1734-45
(1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids].
31. See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs-
Advance Notice of Possible Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,637 (June 21, 1984) [hereinafter Two-Tier Pricing].
32. See William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout
Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 344.
33. See id. The 1982 United States Steel merger with Marathon Oil illustrates the two-step
merger. U.S. Steel obtained control of Marathon with a cash tender offer of $125.00 per share for
approximately 51% of Marathon's outstanding common stock. U.S. Steel then acquired the re-
maining 49% of the stock for $86.00 in a post-tender-offer merger. See Radol v. Thomas, 534 F.
19981
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shareholders in the surviving firm. This second step is commonly re-
ferred to as a "take-out merger," or more pejoratively, as a "freeze-out
merger.
'M
Single-tier (or "any-or-all") bids, by which bidders agree to pur-
chase all shares tendered at a given price, are used more frequently than
explicit two-tier bids or partial offers when the target firm is relatively
small.35 But as target firm size increases, two-tier bids replace any-or-all
offers as the most common form of tender 6 And, though a bidder may
not announce a second (take-out) step initially, seventy-two percent of
successful tender offers are followed within five years by a take-out
merger." A two-tier bid best illustrates the mechanics of the poison pill,
not because pills are limited to that context, but simply because of the
prevalence of two-tier offers in takeovers of large, publicly held com-
panies 8
The advantage of the two-step takeover (in the eyes of the bidder)
is that it places the shareholders of the target firm in a "prisoner's di-
lemma" that leads them to tender their shares.39 This "prisoner's di-
Supp. 1302, 1305 & n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
34. Thus, a take-out merger is a merger in which a dominant shareholder or shareholder
group votes for a merger in which the minority shareholders will not have an equity interest in the
surviving firm. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 624-25 & n.3 (1981). For overviews with contrasting evaluations of freeze-
outs, see Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
987 (1974); Victor Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Victor
Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 297 (1974) [hereinafter Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares]; Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) [hereinafter Brud-
ney & Chirelstein, Corporate Freezeouts]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 723-31 (1982); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out
Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1976); Simon M. Lome, A Reappraisal of
Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978); Bate C. Toms, Ill, Compensat.
ing Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLuM. L. REv. 548 (1978).
35. See Two-Tier Pricing, supra note 31, at 86,921.
36. See id.
37. See Peter Dodd & Richard Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns, 5 J. FIN.
EcON. 351, 352 n.2 (1977); cf Carney, supra note 32, at 348-49 & n.39 (discussing the prevalence
of take-out mergers following tender offers and Dodd & Ruback's empirical evidence).
38. Even without two-tier bids, poison pills are still of value to target shareholders whenever
additional time following an initial offer facilitates the development of an auction for their shares.
For example, in an all-or-nothing bid, the offeror generally conditions her offer on receiving a
certain percentage of the outstanding shares by a certain date. This decreases the likelihood of sub-
sequent bidders trumping the initial offer. Under such circumstances, a poison pill may be a useful
device for "buying time" to see if better offers develop.
39. Game theorists use the term "prisoner's dilemma" to describe a situation where the in-
ability of individuals to coordinate their decisions leads to a suboptimal result from the perspective
of the decision makers. Brudney and Chirelstein were the first to describe the situation facing tar-
get shareholders as a "prisoner's dilemma." See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note
[Vol. 26:835
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lemma" gives the initial bidder M a tactical advantage over subsequent
bidders.4° For the tactic to succeed, however, the initial bidder must
elicit tenders before a competing bidder can enter the market. A higher
blended price offered by a subsequent bidder will defeat the offer of the
initial bidder.41
To illustrate, suppose that the current price of a firm's stock is $30
per share. The firm has 101 shares outstanding and M has acquired as a
"toe hold" one of these shares in an open-market transaction. He pur-
chased the stock after investing $40 in research indicating that under his
ownership/management the value of the firm would increase to $37 per
share. The remaining 100 shares are divided evenly between two peo-
ple, A and B, neither of whom is able to contact the other one without
incurring prohibitive Costs.
4
34, at 337 (describing "whipsaw" effect of two-tier bids on shareholders). For a description of the
"prisoner's dilemma" game, see PErER H. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND
CHoICE 56-58 (1981), and PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICs 482-83 (8th ed. 1970).
40. As applied to the tender offer situation, initial bidders have an advantage because the
best strategy for each target shareholder is to choose to tender even though a better solution would
be for them to agree not to tender. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1040 n.59 (1982); Michael C. Jensen & Rich-
ard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 31-33 (1983). But see Ron-
ald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Ten-
der Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 860 (1981) (arguing that shareholders are not placed in a true
"prisoner's dilemma" because the gain from the premium offered is greater than the anticipated
loss on shares retained). For further discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma" operating in the tender
offer situation, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1173-74 n.33.
41. This proposition is demonstrated empirically in Two-Tier Pricing, supra note 31, at
86,941 (Table 9). Prior to the passage of the Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat.
454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), bidders made their purchases
on a first-come-first-served basis and limited their offers by requiring target shareholders to tender
within a relatively short time. The Williams Act limited these practices. See Carney, supra note
32, at 347; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1162-63
(explaining how prior to 1968 offerors could pressure shareholders to tender by sharply limiting
the time and conditions of the offer). Under current law, a tender offer must be held open for a
minimum of twenty days. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1997). Bidders are required to purchase
all shares that are tendered during this period on a pro rata basis. See id. § 240.14d-8; Pro Rate
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19,336, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982).
42. In the context of actual tender offer situations in publicly held firms, the "prisoner's di-
lemma" results from the high costs to diverse shareholders of communicating among themselves.
The "prisoner's dilemma" is exacerbated in the publicly held firm because individual shareholders
who expend resources to communicate information to fellow shareholders bear all of the costs of
such communication, but share the benefits collectively with all other shareholders. The efficiency
of capital markets makes the dilemma even more acute. Investors who expend resources to un-
cover information and then attempt to capture the value of their investment by purchasing shares
signal the nature of their discovery to other investors; this prevents the initial investor from captur-
ing the full value of her informational investment. See Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securi-
ties: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus.
1998]
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In this situation, M would make, or threaten to make, a two-tier of-
fer for all of the remaining shares. M would promise to pay a premium
for the first fifty shares, but she would also announce that she would
follow with a take-out merger for the remaining fifty shares at the
pre-tender offer price of $30. Suppose that the bid is to purchase the
first fifty shares for $40 each and the remaining fifty for $30 per share,
acquiring all shares at an average price of $35.3 When (and if) the ac-
quisition is completed, the price will climb to $37 under M's manage-
ment, giving M a gross return of $207 ($200 on the 100 shares pur-
chased from A and B, plus $7 on the initial share), and profits of $167
once her research costs are subtracted.
The threatened bid, however, provides useful information to others
that the firm may be undervalued." The news causes other parties to
look at the firm, and A and B may be convinced that at least one of the
third parties, T, would place a higher value on the firm than does M (VT
> V1), and would be willing eventually to make a better offer, say an
average of $39 per share instead of M's $35 per share.45 But A and B are
in a classic "prisoner's dilemma" as illustrated in the matrix below.
179 (1972).
43. The question of how an initial bidder chooses the blended price in a two-tier bid is of
considerable interest in itself, but is not addressed here. At a minimum, to create a "prisoner's di-
lemma," the first-tier bid must be higher than the blended bid expected from a third party. The
minority shareholders' "appraisal rights" also set a lower limit for the second-tier bid. See
WILLIAM L. CARY & MvELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
1452-62 (5th ed. 1980) (discussing appraisal rights); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal
Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modem Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV.
1, 85 (1969) (contending that the appraisal right is a "remedy of desperation"); Bayless Manning,
The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 229 (1962)
(stating that a consequence of the appraisal remedy has been to "consolidate and liberate" man-
agement).
44. "The bid itself... may reveal much of what the offeror has learned.... Indeed, the exis-
tence of an offer by itself tells other prospective bidders where to look, even if it conveys no other
information." Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1178 & n.45; see also
Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. BUS. 345,
347-48 (1980) (explaining that competing bidders, as well as the target itself, may exploit the in-
formation in order to get the best price); Scholes, supra note 42, at 183 (arguing that the sale of
securities indicates the possession of information on the part of the seller).
45. T's willingness to pay $39 per share of course implies that the firm is worth more than
$39 to T.
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The term "prisoner's dilemma' describes the situation that arises
when two prisoners have been apprehended and accused of committing
a crime. Each prisoner will find, when separated from the other, that it
is in his individual interest to confess, even though both prisoners would
be better off if they could coordinate their activities and forge an en-
forceable agreement to remain silent. For example, a "prisoner's di-
lemma" arises where each prisoner is told that he will receive a jail term
of five years if both confess. Each prisoner is also told that if only one
of them confesses, the confessing prisoner will receive a lighter sen-
tence of one year, while the uncooperative prisoner will receive a more
severe sentence of ten years. Finally, the prisoners are told that if both
remain silent, they can only be convicted of a lesser charge, and hence
will receive only two years each.
Under these circumstances, the best outcome for each prisoner
would be obtained by confessing while the other remains silent. On the
other hand, the worst outcome for each prisoner would be to remain si-
lent while the other confesses. Thus, in the absence of an ability to co-
ordinate their actions, the two parties will both confess in order to avoid
the worst possible outcome and to have a chance at the best possible
outcome. When both confess, they each receive a five-year sentence.
Had they been able to coordinate their actions, however, both could
have remained silent, each ending in the better position of receiving a
two-year sentence.46
46. See Carney, supra note 32, at 349 n.39.
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Shareholders are in a similar position when faced with a takeover
bid. Coordination may benefit each shareholder by facilitating collective
outcomes that further the aggregate welfare of all shareholders. M often
has the advantage of having developed her information first and so will
be able to offer and complete acquisition of control before T can make
his own bid. If A falls to tender to M, and B does, B receives $40 for his
shares and A receives only $30. On the other hand, if A and B both ten-
der, B still receives an average of $35 for his shares. Under these cir-
cumstances, B is better off tendering his shares, regardless of whether A
tenders or not. By tendering, B earns at least $5 and perhaps $10 over
the current market price for the shares; by not tendering he loses any
premium. A, of course, is in exactly the same position and will act in the
same way. The result is that both will tender. Under current law, the of-
feror, M, will be required to purchase the shares pro rata.4 A and B will
each receive $40 for twenty-five of the shares they own and $30 for the
remaining twenty-five shares. If the two could communicate, they
would both agree not to tender any of their shares and hold out for the
later, higher offer of $39 per share from T. The inability of A and B to
coordinate their activities results in a total loss to them of $400.
41
In the real world, of course, there will never be complete certainty
that a subsequent bidder will appear. The probability of obtaining con-
trol of the firm may not be great enough to induce any additional parties
to bid. Assembling the information needed to value the target firm is
costly, as is making the bid itself. If the probability of a successful bid is
sufficiently low, the expected value of the takeover to other parties may
fall short of the costs. If so, a given third party would not choose to en-
ter the bidding contest, although he could be the highest-valuing user of
the firm's resources and would have offered the greatest premium to in-
cumbent shareholders.
Shareholders, though, can affect the probabilities so as to increase
the size of their premium. Just as M can raise her likelihood of success
by shortening the time her offer is open, incumbent shareholders A and
B can influence the probabilities the other way. By adopting a poison
pill, shareholders can simply win time for T to put together his offer.
Thus, each shareholder has a strong interest to agree ex ante to certain
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. If A and B could coordinate their actions, they would receive a total of $3900 from the
sale of their shares (100 shares x $39 per share). If A and B tender their shares to M, each will re-
ceive $40 for half and $30 for half. This results in an average price of $35 and a total of $3500
(($30 x 50 shares) + ($40 x 50 shares)). The difference of $400 represents the cost to A and B of
being unable to coordinate their strategy.
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governance mechanisms that can facilitate the types of coordination that
maximize firm value. Empowering managers with the poison pill is one
such agreement.
Poison pills act as a powerful resistance tool, allowing manage-
ment to obtain a higher price for a firm. Defensive tactics to takeovers
help avoid the impact of the "prisoner's dilemma" facing shareholders.
One of the advantages of the poison pill is that it gives managers the
time needed to seek a better offer, either from the initial bidder or from
an alternative bidder. Too often, shareholders will be in the classic
"prisoner's dilemma," causing them to accept an inferior bid. The poi-
son pill gives managers the ability to avoid the problems of this
"prisoner's dilemma" in order to seek a bid that will maximize share
value in the takeover market. Shareholders, therefore, can benefit when
managers retain the option of invoking a poison pill in order to obtain a
higher price for shares.
To return to the numerical example above, suppose again that the
target firm's stock trades at $30 per share. This price reflects the mar-
ket's expectations about future events, including takeovers.49 Assume
that before M acquires her share the market perceives a fifty percent
chance that the firm will be taken over at an average price of $35 per
share and a fifty percent chance that the firm will not be taken over at
all. If the firm is not taken over, it remains in the control of its present
management where the market would value it at only $25 per share. The
firm's current worth of $30 per share is the sum of the expected values
of the two events ($35 x .5 + $25 x .5 = $30).
Shareholders inevitably will search for the best device to mitigate
the effect of the "prisoner's dilemma" and buy time for T's subsequent
bid. That weapon often may be a poison pill. Like a tender offer, the
triggering of a poison pill informs the market that the target firm's stock
may be undervalued. Moreover, once a poison pill is triggered, other
bidders have more time and thus a greater opportunity to formulate their
bids. For both reasons-more information and more time-poison pills
49. In regard to this proposition, Easterbrook and Fischel state:
The value of any stock can be understood as the sum of two components: the price that
will prevail in the market if there is no successful offer (multiplied by the likelihood
that there will be none) and the price that will be paid in a future tender offer
(multiplied by the likelihood that some offer will succeed). A shareholder's welfare is
maximized by a legal rule that enables the sum of these two components to reach its
highest value.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1164. In reality, of course, the value
of a stock reflects a whole range of prices and probabilities, but more complex arithmetic would
not advance the analysis here.
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presumably raise the probability of some bidder T's making an offer
and of an auction developing that will increase the price of a successful
tender so long as redemption of the pill within a short period of time can
reasonably be predicted.
All defensive tactics have the virtue of mitigating the effect of the
"prisoner's dilemma" that faces target shareholders and thus of raising
the aggregate price that a successful bidder must pay for target share-
holders' stock." Gregg Jarrell has demonstrated the magnitude of share-
holders' higher premium gains in an empirical study of target-firm liti-
gation against initial tender offerors.' Many defensive tactics pose
significant risks to the shareholders of target firms. When faced with
these tactics, would-be bidders might find the cost of acquiring the tar-
get prohibitive, and may never make a bid in the first place. 2 This can
occur when a firm's management is using the pill as an entrenchment
device instead of a tool employed merely to buy time to negotiate for
the best deal for shareholders. The higher premiums from resisting ten-
der bids come at some risk that no takeover will subsequently occur.
When no takeover ensues, everybody loses."
The fact that once a tender offer becomes imminent shareholders
may want the board to have the option of a poison pill as a defensive
tactic to initiate an auction market, does not necessarily mean that the
pill is wealth-increasing ex ante. Use of defensive tactics against take-
50. "[Dlefenders of poison pills note that there is some empirical evidence to support the...
theory that, at least in the environment of the 1980s, poison pills enabled the shareholders to re-
ceive higher premiums than would otherwise have been possible." Mark R. Wingerson & Christo-
pher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's
Perspective, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 237; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,
Markets, and Courts, 91 CoLuM. L. REV. 1931, 1948-56 (1991) (compiling evidence on share-
holder gains under poison pills); Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand
Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511,
520 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett] (describing the increases in average
premiums resulting from the use of poison pills).
51. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge
in a Merge?, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). Taking a sample of firms that have resisted initial ten-
der offers by litigating against the bidder, Jarrell finds that the expected gains to target firms from
higher subsequent bids outweigh the costs both from the litigation and from the risk that the tender
offer will be defeated and no subsequent offer will be made. Defensive tactics, that is, may be
"sensible gambles, rather than shameful self-dealing by managers." Id. at 175.
52. In addition to the risk that no bid will be forthcoming, there is also the risk that the de-
fense will succeed without a subsequent bid being made. Jarrell found for his sample that litigation
against a tender offeror carried a risk of almost twenty-five percent that no takeover would occur
after an initial tender offer was defeated by litigation. See id. at 174.
53. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 281-91 (1984) (summarizing evidence from a Kidder, Peabody &
Co. study on the consequences of defensive tactics).
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over bids has provoked considerable controversy. Easterbrook, Fischel,
Bebehuk, and Gilson have all argued that managerial resistance to ten-
der offers by tactics that can actually defeat offers (e.g., scorched-earth
tactics, poison pills, shark repellents, vexatious litigation) should never
be permitted.' Easterbrook and Fischel advocate a rule of complete
managerial passivity that would make it illegal for a firm to do anything
other than conduct the firm's ordinary business in the face of a tender
offer. Their rule would bar even those defensive tactics that do not de-
feat tender offers but help to create an auction market for the target
firm's shares (e.g., mandatory periods before which initial offers must
be completed). Bebchuk and Gilson part company from Easterbrook and
Fischel on this point.5
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize, of course, that resistance may
elicit a higher bid, either from the original offeror or from a second bid-
der, as an auction market for the firm is created. But they see two over-
riding objections to defensive tactics that lead to auctions and takeovers
at higher premiums." The first is the ability of third parties to free ride
on information gathered by the first offeror at some cost. The free ride
means that less information is produced, which in turn reduces outside
monitoring of managerial performance. 7 Second, Easterbrook and
Fischel object to defensive tactics, even those creating auctions, because
the measures consume real resources."
The transfer of resources from lower to higher-valuing users not
only raises firms' share prices but also increases total wealth, and so
performs an important social function. Prospective tender offerors make
considerable contributions to the process of value-creation by locating
undervalued assets and providing the information to move them to those
who can use them more efficiently. But potential bidders are exposed to
victimization by others who can free ride on the information produced
and thus reap returns from information obtained without payment. 9
Even if no defensive tactics are used, subsequent bidders can take ad-
54. See Bebchuk, supra note 40, at 1028-29; Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, su-
pra note 30, at 1164; Gilson, supra note 40, at 845-46.
55. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1982), with Bebchuk, supra note 40, at 1029-30, and Gilson, su-
pra note 40, at 882.
56. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1174-82.
57. See id. at 1178-80.
58. See id. at 1175-76.
59. See id. at 1178-80; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the
Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980) (analyzing
shareholder's ability to free ride on takeover information).
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vantage of the information created by the initial bidder because "using
information often gives it away."' The initial bid signals to other inves-
tors that undervalued assets have been located. Because the subsequent
bidders have incurred no costs to acquire information, they can offer
more to target-firm shareholders, forcing the initial bidder to increase
her offer or lose the opportunity to acquire the target firm.6'
By increasing the premium a first offeror must pay or by reducing
the likelihood of his offer succeeding, defensive tactics (including those
that encourage creation of auctions) reduce a bidder's incentive to lo-
cate attractive targets and invest in first offers. Defensive tactics em-
ployed once the initial bid is made afford subsequent bidders an even
greater opportunity to free ride on information generated by the first
bidder.62 It is not just prospective initial bidders who are harmed, how-
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 55, at 4. Easterbrook and Fisehel have noted:
As a result, no firm wants to be the first bidder unless it has some advantage, such as
speed, over subsequent bidders to compensate for the fact that only it had to incur
monitoring costs. And, of course, if there is no first bidder there will be no later bidders
and no tender premium.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1179 (footnote omitted).
61. Bebchuk and Gilson have suggested that initial offerors can prevent a complete free ride
on the information they develop by buying a minority stake in the firm, which then appreciates
when a subsequent bidder (while free riding on the initial offeror's information) engineers a suc-
cessful takeover. See Bebchuk, supra note 40, at 1035; Gilson, supra note 40, at 871. Easterbrook
and Fischel quite correctly note, however, that this only mitigates, but by no means dispels, the
free rider problem. See Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 55, at 4-5. If the bidder acquires a ten
percent stake before making an unsuccessful first bid, she still loses up to ninety percent of the
value of her information.
The market for information, however, may make it profitable for some firms to acquire in-
formation and trade it when the information becomes a commodity of value. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 55, at 18 ("[L]earning about firms and taking them over are separate tasks....
Firms specializing in generating information might find their returns highest when they have other
firms engage in tender offer auctions.").
One case is illustrative. In Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir.
1984), a firm (Prochemco) had developed information that another corporation (National Alfalfa)
was an attractive acquisition. Prochemco's information about National Alfalfa was contained in
internal reports, including an appraisal of National Alfalfa's assets. Prochemco originally intended
a takeover of National Alfalfa itself, but eventually sold the reports to Bass Brothers for $130,000.
Bass Brothers then used the information to acquire the firm. From the recitation of facts in the
Third Circuit's opinion, Bass Brothers apparently had no inkling of the opportunity that National
Alfalfa represented until alerted by Prochemco. See id. at 981.
Possession of valuable information does not guarantee that a third party will profit from it.
A subsequent bidder may free ride on the information and complete a takeover, leaving the devel-
oper of the information with no return. The target firm itself will always benefit from the informa-
tion. The greater certainty of profit increases the incentive of target firms to purchase information,
all other things equal.
62. In his study of resistance to tender offers by litigation, Jarrell is unable to account statis-
tically for free riding, but suggests its magnitude may be great enough to make managerial resis-
tance socially undesirable:
[Vol, 26:835
HeinOnline -- 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 852 1997-1998
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BYLAW
ever. Fewer bids also harm shareholders of potential targets.' As
Easterbrook and Fischel observe, the reduced incentive to scrutinize
firms for undervaluation affects the entire market for corporate control:
[S]hareholders benefit [from tender offer bids] even if their corpora-
tion never is the subject of a tender offer. The process of monitoring
by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if performance lags.
Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the
chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to
higher prices for shares. 4
In general, that is, defensive tactics reduce the number of tender of-
fers launched, and so reduce aggregate firm value. For this reason, the
ability to limit the scope of a defensive tactic is in the interest of both
shareholders and overall societal wealth.
There is another objection raised by critics to the use of defensive
tactics in resisting takeover bids. The very process of resistance itself
consumes real resources. 5 The most obvious example is litigation,
which consumes the time and talent of managers, legal staff, judges, and
so on. The deadweight social costs can amount to millions of dollars.66
These losses are reflected in lower values that bidders will offer when
resistance is expected. Shareholder rights bylaws, costless to the firm
because their adoption does not require the expenditure of corporate
funds, can "economize on costly defensive tactics" and thereby decrease
the resource consumption problem of poison pills.6
[Ilt is important to recognize that this conclusion-that litigious defenses can be bene-
ficial to target shareholders--does not imply that such actions enhance social welfare.
Indeed, the opposite is more likely to be true, because litigious defenses redistribute
some of the gains from corporate combinations from acquirers to the targets. This redis-
tribution is analogous to a tax on acquirers. Under the assumption that sunk invest-
ments by the acquirers produce the bulk of the gains to takeovers, this tax will deter
future investments in this valuable acquisition-oriented information.
Jarrell, supra note 51, at 175.
63. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1180.
64. Id. at 1174 (footnote omitted).
65. See id. at 1175. The loss is the opportunity cost of the resources used in resistance. If
these resources were not consumed in the process of resisting, they would, presumably, be put to
some productive use. "Society as a whole loses when traders fight over the gains from trade."
Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
YALE L.J. 13, 32 n.75 (1985). For demonstrations of this proposition, see Eugene F. Fama & Ar-
thur B. Laffer, Information and Capital Markets, 44 J. Bus. 289 (1971); Jack Hirshleifer, The Pri-
vate and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV.
561 (1971).
66. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1175 n.39 (describing
the costs of defensive litigation).
67. Coffee, supra note 4, at 613.
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C. Abuses of the Poison Pill
The principal objection to defensive tactics such as the poison pill
stems from the Berle-Means paradigm of separation of ownership and
control in the modem corporation," or from what Michael Jensen and
William Meckling have analyzed more carefully as the problem of
"agency costs" within large firms. 69 A manager, as the shareholders'
agent, should use corporate assets only to increase the value of the firm.
In reality, however, with positive shareholder monitoring costs, a man-
ager concerned about his job may be able to act to protect his tenure at
shareholders' expense. A substantial newly assembled minority block of
shares may be the prelude to a tender offer or some other change in cor-
porate control, putting the manager's future employment at risk. Rather
than lose his job, the agency-cost hypothesis predicts that the manager
will opportunistically exploit his control of corporate assets to remove
the risk.7" The agency-cost objection applies to defensive tactics gener-
ally. Thus, it is not surprising that poison pills are used to help man-
agement entrench itself by "just saying no."
Market correctives inhibit at least some agency-cost problems in
the firm. The "market for managers" penalizes management teams who
try to advance their own interests at shareholders' expense.7' Sharehold-
68. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933).
69. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling de-
fine and describe the agency relationship as
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility
maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best
interests of the principal.
Id. at 308. Because of the tendency of the agent to act in ways that are not in the best interests of
the principal, both the principal and the agent have incentives to incur costs to reduce the inci-
dence of such behavior. These costs, along with any residual cost from undesirable behavior that is
not deterred, are the costs of a principal-agent relationship. See id.
70. See WARREN BUFFET, KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 15-16 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (stating that managers "simply don't want
to be dispossessed-no matter how attractive the offer .... If they can keep the keys to the store,
they usually will."); Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J.
54, 65 (arguing that poison pills are an effective tool to entrench management).
71. The theory of a "market for managers" goes back at least to Armen A. Alchian, Corpo-
rate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REoULATION OF COR-
PORATE SECURIms 337, 342-51 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969). The theory was formalized and ex-
tended in Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
292-95 (1980). I do not suggest, of course, that the "market for managers" is perfect in some ideal-
ized way, nor that it alone operates to monitor management. I note only that "[ain important
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ers have also demonstrated the ability in other contexts to perceive the
agency-cost dilemmas inherent in managerial decisions that affect man-
agers' job tenure, and to mitigate them by charter amendments.72 The
shareholder rights bylaw is merely the latest manifestation of this miti-
gation strategy.
The market for corporate control works to identify weak managers.
Poison pills can prevent a change in management when extended long
enough to keep the costs of a takeover prohibitively high until potential
bidders lose interest altogether. Thus, by refusing to redeem a pill, a
board can eliminate the firm as a profitable commodity in the takeover
market, thereby retaining the status quo in which they maintain control.
As a result, not only will the pill possibly prevent shareholders from
gaining from a higher price for shares offered by the bidder, inefficient
management may not be replaced. This perpetuates the harm that the
current management team is imposing both on the shareholders and on
societal wealth. Furthermore, the monitoring function served by the
market for corporate control is dealt a serious blow because potential
acquirers are deterred from tendering an initial offer in the first place
because the pill makes the cost of acquisition artificially (and prohibi-
tively) high. Thus, less information is gathered and transmitted in the
market about poorly functioning managers and less replacement also re-
sults.
The poison pill is open to abuse because it is an effective en-
trenchment tool, especially when coupled with the low probability of
judicial invalidation of the pill.73 Nonetheless, as previously discussed,
premise of corporate finance theory is that markets discipline managers to maximize all stockhold-
ers' wealth. Competitive forces in two markets, the market for corporate control and the market for
managerial labor services, are widely viewed as providing complementary enforcement of the
stockholder wealth maximization rule." Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements,
Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON.
275, 275 (1983). For empirical evidence on one way the "market for managers" works, see Roger
L. Faith et al., Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm, 74 AM. ECON.
REv. 660, 662-65 (1984) (stating that firns reduce agency costs by increasing turnover of manag-
ers and paying higher salaries as turnover rises).
72. For example, the adoption of "golden parachute" agreements by shareholders as a means
of aligning the interests of managers more closely with their own illustrates the ability of share-
holders to react effectively to the agency-cost problems described above. See William J. Kamey,
Pols Poking Holes in Golden Parachutes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1984, at 32. Studies show that
adoption of such provisions causes a firm's stock to rise. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Lar-
cker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Accr. &
ECON. 179, 183-85 (1985).
73. See Invin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial Review of
Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BuS. LAW. 647, 647 (1991) (outlining the various legal
factors that have strengthened the authority of boards to defend against hostile takeovers).
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the poison pill is an important tool for raising shareholder value. Thus,
finding ways to keep the pill but curb the abuse should be of critical im-
portance to the development of efficient corporate governance mecha-
nisms.
Finally, even if it is assumed that managers are truly able at times
to advance their tenure at the expense of their principals' wealth, it does
not follow that shareholders would necessarily want to strip managers of
the authority to use poison pills. In the situations identified earlier-
where a higher takeover bid can be expected if the takeover is de-
layed-the incentives of both shareholders and the managers run in the
same direction. Admittedly, shareholders and managers might want to
use the pill for quite different reasons. But the fact that managers do
what shareholders want for selfish reasons is of no concern to share-
holders. 4 Indeed, successful firms are precisely those that align share-
holder and manager incentives. Managers may do the right things (from
the shareholders' perspective) for the wrong reasons. 5 The goal is to
find ways that either courts or the shareholders can preclude manage-
ment from doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons.
II. THE SYSTEMATIC EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHOICES
A. Preserving the Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is a device for monitoring man-
agement. The performance of corporate governance systems can be
categorized on the basis of how well they impede managers' ability to
divert firm resources to their own, private uses.76 Underlying this stan-
74. See generally Armen A. Alehian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J.
POL. ECON. 211, 213 (1950) ("It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation
such success [i.e., profitability] was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is sufficient. This is
the criterion by which the economic system selects [its] survivors .... ).
75. Jarrell's evidence on litigation defenses to takeover bids is also instructive. Manage-
ment's decision to litigate in order to block a takeover bid prolongs their job tenure. See Jarrell,
supra note 51, at 175. However, Jarrell finds even when litigation is successful, most firms are
eventually taken over, but at substantial premiums above the initial bid price. Some firms are not
taken over, but the gains in auctions and higher premiums produced by litigation exceed the losses
to those firms that do not get attractive second bids. Ex ante, then, wealth-maximizing sharehold-
ers would want management to litigate-as would tenure-maximizing managers themselves. This
does not mean, of course, that litigation is economically efficient. It may simply be a way of free-
riding on the information developed by the initial bidder whose offer is defeated by litigation.
76. See RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Working Paper 5661, 1996); Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the
Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REv. FIN. STuD. 125 (1994).
[Vol. 26:835
HeinOnline -- 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 856 1997-1998
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BYLAW
dard is an understanding that directors should not place their interests
ahead of those of the shareholders. When a board uses a defensive
mechanism to block a takeover that would be beneficial to the stock-
holders, they are placing their private interest in retaining control above
the shareholders' interests.
An important measure of the performance of a corporate govern-
ance system is the functioning of internal and external markets for cor-
porate control. Put simply, if a particular system of corporate govern-
ance is functioning properly, inefficient management will be replaced
after a contest for control.77 As Geoffrey Miller and I have pointed out,
"[t]he market for corporate control lies at the heart of the American
system of corporate governance." '78 As early as 1965, Henry Manne
posited that the market for corporate control best disciplines managers
because, unlike mergers, takeovers do not require the approval of the
board of directors of the target firm.7' Thus, outside bidders can appeal
directly to target shareholders for their approval. And, as Roberta Ro-
mano has observed, takeovers provide a backstop mechanism for
monitoring corporate performance when other corporate governance
devices fail.0 Hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and re-
place their inadequate or shirking managers with rival management
teams thereby keeping the capital market competitive and constraining
managers to maximize value for shareholders.8
The basic theory is simple: outside bidders have an incentive to
monitor incumbent managers because they can profit by buying the
shares of poorly managed firms and installing better management
teams.8 Bidders must share these gains with target-firm shareholders,
but as long as bidders can earn a risk-adjusted market rate of return on
their investments, they will find it in their interests to monitor target
management teams on behalf of incumbent firm shareholders. Romano
has made an extensive review of the empirical evidence and finds that it
77. See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese
Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 225, 256-57 (1994).
78. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 73, 101 (1995).
79. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110,117 (1965).
80. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE
J. ON REG. 119, 129-31 (1992).
81. See id.
82. See Manne, supra note 79, at 113.
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is consistent with this inefficient management explanation of take-
overs.
83
In addition to disciplining particular managers, the market for cor-
porate control has important third-party effects. An active takeover
market affects managerial performance in a positive way, even in the
absence of a formally announced takeover bid, because target managers
will want to keep their share price high in order to reduce the probabil-
ity that they will be displaced by a hostile takeover. Thus, even if the
probability of a takeover is slight, risk-averse managers can be expected
to work harder when there is a positive probability that a hostile bid will
be announced.
A robust market for corporate control improves management's per-
formance because incumbents inevitably prefer to reduce the probabil-
ity that an outside bid will be made. Incumbent management will be
unsure how much better a particular rival management team is; conse-
quently, management will be unsure how far the firm's share price
must fall before attracting a hostile bid. This uncertainty creates an in-
centive for managers to improve the firm's performance, even if a
hostile offer never actually materializes. 4
Further, those who argue that takeovers are too expensive and
therefore too "lumpy" to be an effective governance device ignore the
fact that an investor need not launch a full-blown tender offer to put a
target company effectively "in play." Investors may launch a proxy
contest for as little as $5000 (down from $1 million a few years ago).
The market for corporate control serves as a mechanism for replac-
ing weak managers with superior managers and for giving managers
greater incentives to perform better. Takeovers provide a form of con-
tinued and textured monitoring. In a properly functioning corporate
governance system, poorly performing management teams will be re-
placed.85 A corporate governance system that does not replace poorly
performing managers is not working very well. The United States's
market-oriented system of corporate governance has been hurt in recent
years by the wave of anti-takeover statutes and court decisions that are
hampering the market for corporate control. 6 When boards of directors
learn to use defense mechanisms to block takeovers, inefficient boards
can both avoid being replaced and consequently have less of an incen-
83. See Romano, supra note 80, at 130-31.
84. Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 104.
85. See Manne, supra note 79, at 113.
86. See id.
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tive to improve performance to avoid becoming a target. One of the few
salutary effects that institutional investors are having on United States
corporate governance is their actions directed at lowering or removing
some of these barriers, including movements to implement shareholder
rights bylaws.
Because the existence of an unfettered poison pill option lowers the
probability of a bid ever surfacing, poison pills hinder the effectiveness
of the market for corporate control by sending negative cost signals to
outside bidders. The greater the likelihood of redemption of the pill,
however, the less the existence of the poison pill will deter outside bid-
ders. One way to increase the likelihood of redemption is through the
shareholder rights bylaw. The shareholder rights bylaw sends a positive
signal to potential bidders that might otherwise be discouraged from
seeking to take over a firm knowing that, absent such a bylaw, the invo-
cation of a poison pill would be almost inevitable. Thus, shareholder
options that might not otherwise have surfaced will become available.
B. Jurisdictional Competition and the Stakes for Delaware
Like other high-stakes corporate governance games, political con-
siderations will count for at least as much as economic and legal factors
in determining the outcomes of disputes over shareholder rights bylaws.
State law judges might think that declaring these rights bylaws invalid
will be the safest strategy. Jurisdictional competition, however, may
make a declaration of validity far more politically safe. The importance
of institutional investors has increased in the last decade. They are also
more organized, more sophisticated, and more inclined to express their
views. Savvy fund managers at behemoths such as the College Retire-
ment Equity Fund (CREF) and the California Public Employees Retire-
ment System (Calpers) will object if managers try to thwart shareholder
rights bylaws and may insist that the companies they are investing in in-
corporate in those jurisdictions that are most attentive to shareholder
value.
Delaware, as well as all other jurisdictions, has an incentive to
make its corporate governance rules attractive to those who control in-
corporation decisions-shareholders as the owners of firms. States are
self-interested actors, and in the area of takeover rules, Delaware courts
and its legislature have adjusted the rules to maintain Delaware's pre-
dominant role in the incorporation market of the past." This reaction is
87. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 3, at 163-66.
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fueled by the recognition by Delaware officials that its dominance in the
market for incorporation cannot be taken for granted.
Jurisdictional competition for corporate charters has been an effec-
tive means of maximizing the efficiency of corporate governance in the
United States."8 And changes in corporate governance rules adverse to
the interests of shareholders have empirically proven to spur exit from a
less than optimal jurisdictional environment. In fact, Delaware's rise to
the winner's circle in the competition for corporate chartering was pre-
cipitated by mistakes in New Jersey. Around the turn of the century, the
corporation code in New Jersey was tightened, primarily as a result of
the political climate. 9 In addition, judicial hostility to corporations also
played a significant role in driving corporate charters out of New Jer-
sey.'* The fall of New Jersey in the market for corporate chartering is
indicative of the fragility of jurisdictional dominance in this field,9' es-
pecially given the relative ease by which corporations can reincorporate
in the modern system.
Delaware risks losing its dominant position in the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters if it does not uphold the legality of a
shareholder rights bylaw. Given Delaware's large stake in the corporate
chartering market, officials may wish to heed the lessons of the past.
This is especially true in light of the importance of this issue to institu-
tional investors who are likely to actively search for jurisdictions
friendly to shareholder interests. Delaware has the opportunity to main-
tain its market share by supporting the shareholder rights bylaw. Failure
by Delaware to embrace this legal innovation could be the watershed
event that shifts dominance from Delaware to another, more share-
holder-friendly jurisdiction. The only question that remains is whether
Delaware will accept innovation to maintain its status as a leader or will
it, as New Jersey was almost one hundred years ago, be left behind.
88. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENiuS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)
(discussing the importance of competition among states for corporate charters in defining Ameri-
can corporate law).
89. See ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATELAW 97 (1993).
90. See id.
91. See generally id. (describing New Jersey's demise as the leading state in corporate char-
ters); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corpo-
rate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985) (offering a legal and economic account of the de-
cline and fall of the special corporate charter in the United States); Christopher Grandy, New
Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677 (1989) (documenting the
story of New Jersey's innovation, dominance in the market for corporate charters, and loss of po-
sition to Delaware).
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III. THE UTILITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BYLAW
Courts claimed that they would police uses of poison pills. Because
they fail in this task, however, the shareholder rights bylaw is the only
viable alternative for policing the abusive use of poison pills. As one
commentator has stated it, "the shareholder effort to use the bylaw
amendment process [to gain control over the poison pill] may be pro-
voked by the sense of a judicial failure in enforcing a sufficiently robust
set of fiduciary duties for the board."'
The structure of the shareholder rights bylaw is exemplified by the
proposal of Guy P. Wyser-Pratte to the shareholders of Pennzoil.93 The
proposal resulted after Pennzoil received a tender offer from Union Pa-
cific Resources Group Inc. The Pennzoil board used the poison pill to
"just say no" to the offer, maintaining the pill for an extended period of
time until the offer eventually terminated.9 Wyser-Pratte's proposal
applies when there is an offer to purchase one hundred percent of com-
mon stock at a twenty-five percent premium over the market price.95 It
would cause the board of directors to cease using a poison pill to block
an offer after ninety days unless the shareholders approve continued use
of the pill to block the offer.96
Thus, by providing an automatic review by the shareholders of a
poison pill, bidders will be more confident that management will be un-
able to entrench itself in conflict with shareholder interests. Thus, fewer
bidders will be deterred from tendering an offer. This benefits the
shareholders and overall efficiency in two ways. First, greater monitor-
ing occurs through the market for corporate control. Thus, inefficient
managers will be less successful at entrenching themselves and will be
replaced, presumably with a management team able to bring a better
return to the stockholders and decrease waste and increase productivity
in the firm. At the same time, managers will be more likely to perceive
the takeover market as a serious threat to their tenure and thereby have a
greater incentive to perform well so as to avoid becoming a target.
Again, this helps the shareholders and the firm's contribution to societal
efficiency. Second, shareholders will have more options to reap the
92. Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, supra note 50, at 552.
93. See Jonathan R. Macey, Manager's Journal: A Poison Pill That Shareholders Can
Swallow, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1998, at A22.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also Seth Goodchild & Daniel J. Buzzetta, Shareholder Rights By-Law
Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 1997, at 5 (describing a similar proposal to the shareholders of
Wallace Computer Services Inc.).
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benefits immediately accompanying a tender offer-a higher value for
their shares. Thus, the ninety day time limit allows the shareholders to
reap the benefits of the poison pill-by avoiding the "prisoner's di-
lemma" and by buying time to negotiate an even better bid-while pre-
venting the board from using the pill as an entrenchment technique. The
ability to approve continued use of the pill enables the shareholders to
either buy more time or to push away a bidder that they believe is truly
adverse to their best interests.
When ownership is widely dispersed, no one shareholder will find
it cost effective to draft and obtain adoption of a charter amendment
such as the shareholder rights bylaw. Adoption campaigns can be vigor-
ous and expensive and shareholders may have little incentive to pursue
the adoption of proposals by the significant free rider problems in-
volved.' Additionally, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that since manag-
ers want to keep their jobs, they are unlikely to draft or support charter
amendments or changes in bylaws that encourage tender offers.98
Nonetheless, shareholder rights bylaws are emerging, largely as the re-
sult of efforts by institutional investors less impeded by collective ac-
tion problems,99 including the transaction and information costs associ-
ated with obtaining adoption of a bylaw principally favored by
shareholders, i.e., a bylaw not likely to align the interests of managers
and shareholders.' °
The structure of the corporate governance process prevents share-
holders from making rapid changes in their articles of incorporation or
from passing bylaws. Substantive changes require a shareholder vote.' '
This takes time, particularly when shareholders are widely dispersed.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of soliciting proxies are controlled by
federal rules,"a creating further delay. Thus, shareholders' ability to im-
97. See Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 797.
98. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Management Role, supra note 30, at 1161, 1175, 1181.
99. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Ap-
proach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 347 (1991) (contending that the shareholder
"voice" has increased as a result of the rise of institutional investor ownership and the lower col-
lective action barriers facing institutional investors).
100. Easterbrook and Fisehel posit that a number of contractual devices in corporate govern-
ance emerge if the mechanisms align the interests of managers and shareholders. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271,
277-78 (1986).
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (b)(1)-(2) (1991); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 10.03 (1994).
102. The solicitation of proxies is controlled by the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (1994), and by Regulation 14A of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a (1997). SEC Rule 14a-6 requires that five copies of all proxy statements and accompa-
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pede the adoption of a defensive measure such as the poison pill through
governance mechanisms cannot easily be accomplished once a bid is in
place. The shareholder rights bylaw invests shareholders with the means
for monitoring the managerial response to a takeover action prior to
such action. Thus, normal delays in amending the charter are avoided in
the immediate period after the takeover.
Similarly, the highly deferential business judgment rule makes it
difficult for shareholders to challenge a board's action in court. The un-
derlying justification for the business judgment rule is that courts should
not substitute their own business judgment for that of the directors, un-
less the board's actions can be shown to serve no rational business pur-
pose. Thus, a plaintiff challenging a board's decision bears the burden
of rebutting the business judgment rule's presumption favoring the
board if he is to convince the court to contravene a board's decision.103
As discussed earlier, the standard of review of poison pills amounts
typically to little more than an application of the business judgment
rule. The low probability of shareholder success, combined with the free
rider problems associated with successful litigation, normally leaves any
one shareholder with little incentive to challenge a board's action in
court.
Furthermore, without the shareholder rights bylaw, boards can rely
on board composition innovations that make it almost impossible for
shareholders to override a board's decision to not redeem a poison pill.
As poison pills became more and more effective at thwarting takeovers,
acquirers began attempting to overcome the poison pills by coupling a
tender offer with a proxy contest to unseat directors and thereby gain the
power to redeem the pill.'" Boards of directors responded with the use
of staggered boards, making the unseating of a majority almost impos-
sible in one election alone and thereby stretching the fight for "two
elections and often the better part of two years." ' These tactics have
received judicial approval."6 Similarly, continuing director provisions in
poison pills, often characterized as "deadhand" pills, were instituted,
granting only continuing directors the right to vote to redeem a pill,
thereby making a change in the board ineffective at removing the im-
nying forms be filed with the SEC ten days prior to the date such material is given to stockholders,
although the SEC may authorize a reduction in the ten-day period "upon a showing of good cause
therefor." § 240.14a-6(a).
103. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
104. See Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, supra note 50, at 522-23.
105. Coffee, supra note 4, at 606.
106. See Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, supra note 50, at 523 & n.42.
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pediment created by the pill.'0 A recent case applying Georgia law in
federal court upheld this type of pill."' However, cases in New York and
Delaware have invalidated deadhand pills. '9
Overall, shareholders have an incentive to pass a bylaw granting
them the means to police poison pills in the absence of an acceptable
policing option in the current system. Because the shareholder rights
bylaw does not eliminate the poison pill option for a firm, the benefits
of the poison pill, including its ability to solve the problems of the clas-
sic "prisoner's dilemma" facing shareholders, can still be retained in the
face of a takeover. At the same time, poison pills used to block any
higher price, as opposed to those used to search for the best price, can
be avoided.
In fact, the benefits of poison pills will survive precisely because
the self-interest of shareholders will lead them to employ their powers
under a shareholder rights bylaw efficiently. First, shareholders recog-
nize that the proper use of the pill can increase the value of their hold-
ings. Second, as described in the analysis of the "prisoner's dilemma",
the rational shareholder will prefer the opportunity to agree ex ante to
mechanisms which eliminate the "coercive" effects of a tender offer.
Gordon argues that shareholders can be trusted to make the right choice:
If indeed poison pills provide a mechanism that enhances shareholder
welfare-because of the negotiating leverage given the board in facing
a potential acquirer-then there is every reason to believe that share-
holder action would not drastically detoxify the poison pill .... [T]here
is no reason to think shareholders would carelessly surrender the pill's
advantages. Recent shareholder votes on bylaw amendments regarding
poison pills bear this out.'
Rational shareholders may still give managers the discretion to use
a poison pill, even recognizing that managerial and shareholder incen-
tives do not always coincide. The interests of shareholders may be
served even when managers act perfectly selfishly. If, for example,
managers invoke a poison pill solely to keep their jobs in the face of a
hostile tender offer but the pill's use causes the value of the company's
107. Seeid. at531-36.
108. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1580-81 (N.D. Ga.
1997).
109. See Carnody v. Toll Bros., C.A. No. 15983, 1998 WL 418896, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 27,
1998); Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
110. Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, supra note 50, at 550 (citing the results of the
Healthdyne/Invacare contest and the case of the May Department Stores as recent examples of
economically rational shareholder action in limiting use of poison pills).
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shares to rise, rational profit-maximizing shareholders will permit even
self-interested managers to use a poison pill. The ultimate test of man-
agement action is not motive, but result.
IV. THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BYLAW IN
DELAWARE
Concerns about the legality of the shareholder rights bylaws
center around the applications of state statutory provisions such as sec-
tion 141(a) of Delaware corporate law, which says that a corporation is
to be managed by or under the direction of their board of directors."'
Also in question is Delaware section 203(a), investing in the board of
directors the power and duty to assess and approve business combina-
tions."2 Whether these powers are unduly infringed by allowing share-
holders to pass a rights bylaw pursuant to their power to amend the by-
laws of a firm under Delaware's section 109(b)".3 is the issue to be
resolved.
The legality of the shareholder rights bylaw is an unsettled legal
question. It received its only test in a case arising under Oklahoma state
law in International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v.
Fleming Cos.14 In an oral ruling, the judge in Fleming upheld the legal
validity of a bylaw requiring a shareholder vote on any poison pill be-
fore the pill could become effective."' The Oklahoma statutory provi-
sions in question were almost identical to Delaware sections 141(a) and
109(b)."6 The court's ruling was consistent with the core principle that
shareholders are the ones most concerned with the marketability of
shares and should not be limited in their rights to merely an ex post re-
view of a board's actions."7 Fleming, therefore, stands as a precedent
that shareholders have a legal right to prescribe rules ex ante governing
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
112. See id. § 203(a).
113. See id. § 109(b).
114. No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997),
stay refused, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 1997). For discussions of the
Fleming case, see Coffee, supra note 4, at 611-13, and Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, su-
pra note 50, at 544-45.
115. A short form order was also issued, without the court's reasoning. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters Gen. Fund, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980, at *1; see also Goodchild & Buzzetta, su-
pra note 96, at 5, 6 (explaining how the court upheld a shareholder rights bylaw in an oral ruling);
More Fallout from Fleming, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, May 1997, at 2-4 (explaining the same).
116. See Henry Lesser & Douglas Sugimoto, Emerging Trends in the Use of Shareholder
Bylaw Amendments, CORP. GovERNANCEADVISOR, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 15, 17.
117. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980, at *1.
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board discretion in takeover actions.
No Delaware court has addressed the legality of the shareholder
rights bylaw. Nevertheless, interpretation of Delaware law and the bal-
ancing of the interests of both shareholders and managers counsel
against invalidation of such bylaws. As Coffee has described:
Proponents of shareholder authority to adopt a bylaw amendment that
requires redemption of a poison pill can advance some non-frivolous
arguments for their position: (1) such bylaw amendments do not re-
quire expenditure of corporate funds nor typically mandate the taking
of any affirmative step (and may in fact economize on costly defensive
tactics); (2) they also do not interfere with "ordinary business deci-
sions," as that phrase is usually understood, because a poison pill rep-
resents a fundamental financial decision, and one having no impact on
"ordinary" day-to-day operations; (3) such bylaw amendments serve to
protect shareholder interests in an area where they have a vital inter-
est-namely, the marketability of their shares-because poison pills
and shareholder rights plans do necessarily restrict the field of eligible
buyers and thus affect share marketability.
1 8
Thus, many of the underlying goals of corporate governance are fur-
thered by the shareholder rights bylaw.
Those court decisions upholding the power of the board to use a
poison pill do not circumscribe the shareholder's right to rescind that
power. Instead, those cases can be described as establishing a default
rule, not an immutable one. It would seem clear that if directors have
the legal power to impose a poison pill, afortiori, the shareholders have
the authority to impose a modest constraint on that power. Furthermore,
cases holding that directors may not delegate management duties are
clearly inapplicable to the situation created by the shareholder rights
bylaw-where power is taken away by shareholders, not delegated away
by the directors themselves. This distinction underscores that directors'
powers should be viewed by courts as responsibilities rather than rights.
Supporting this precedent, there are three reasons why such a bylaw is
not an illegal infringement on the power of the board.
The rules giving directors the power to run firms exist in the first
place to ensure accountability by directors and to protect shareholders
from secret agreements among other shareholders to change firm strat-
egy. Indeed, historically and at common law, the power to adopt,
amend, and repeal bylaws was vested exclusively in the shareholders. " 9
118. Coffee, supra note 4, at 613.
119. Seeid. at606n.5.
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Section 141(a) of Delaware law provides that "[t]he business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter [Delaware
General Corporation Law] shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chap-
ter or in its certificate of incorporation."'' Thus, although section 141(a)
gives the board the authority to manage the corporation, it makes clear
that this authority may be conditioned by other provisions in the corpo-
rate law. In other words, section 141(a) contains a cross reference to
section 109(b) which specifically gives the shareholders the right to
condition the rights or powers of directors through bylaws.'2' Due to its
final clause, section 141(a) cannot stand on its own as a defense for
those wishing to find the shareholder rights bylaw illegal. Instead, that
final clause requires one to examine the remainder of the corporation
statute, particularly section 109(b) of the Delaware corporate code.
Section 109 resembles Revised Model Business Corporation Act
("RMBCA") section 10.20.'2 RMBCA section 10.20 empowers both the
board and the shareholders to amend the bylaws, unless the articles re-
serve that power exclusively to the shareholders.'2 Section 10.20 grants
shareholders the power to pass a bylaw and place it beyond board re-
peal. 24 Similarly, critical dicta in a Delaware Chancery Court decision
indicates that shareholders may reinstate a bylaw repealed by the board
and add a provision insulating the reinstated bylaw from amendment by
the board.2' Nonetheless, shareholders can shield their bylaw from re-
peal or modification by using procedural limitations-by specifying in
the bylaw's text the requirements for how the board can amend it.'26
Under section 109(b), shareholders retain the power to adopt,
amend, and repeal corporate bylaws.' 27 This specific empowerment of
shareholders should trump any vague, general norms about directors'
power to run the firm, particularly because the shareholders rights by-
law does not interfere with directors' ability to make strategic decisions
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
121. See id § 109(b).
122. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 10.20 (1994).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 10.20(a)(2).
125. See American Int'l Rent A Car, Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583, 1984 WL 8204, at *3 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 1984); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time
Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 837, 890 (1994) (concluding that allowing shareholders to deny the
board power to amend a shareholder-approved bylaw reaches the "appropriate reconciliation" for
the tension in this area between shareholder rights and board powers).
126. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 618.
127. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1991). For a similar provision in New York, see
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(a) (McKinney 1986).
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about the firm's operation. Delaware section 109(b) states: "[Tihe by-
laws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or pow-
ers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees."' ' The impor-
tance of the shareholder voting process is underscored by this section. 21
Statutory interpretation rules require that section 141(a)'s excep-
tions clause includes section 109(b). The language of 109(b) would be
meaningless if section 141(a) were construed to give the board of direc-
tors exclusive powers over the business and affairs of the corporation,
except for matters explicitly made subject to a shareholder vote in other
provisions in the statute. It is a well accepted canon of statutory con-
struction that no interpretation should make a provision meaningless.
For that reason, as well as the clear and unequivocal language of
section 109(b), shareholders should retain the right to pass a bylaw
limiting director authority over takeover bids. Similarly, section 203(a)
merely discusses powers, which, according to clear language in section
109(b), can be altered by the shareholders through a bylaw.'
Relying on the language of 109(b) to alter the bylaws as definitive
also permits shareholders, should they so desire, to empower the board
to use poison pills or other defensive mechanisms. As Mark Roe has
stated, the empirical evidence suggests that state "antitakeover laws do
no more than what charter amendments could do."'' Shareholders have
the choice whether to include antitakeover devices in the contractual
relationship. In order to find the use of a shareholder rights bylaw legal,
the courts need not invalidate the legality of the poison pill. Instead, by
embracing the shareholder rights bylaw as legal, courts would merely
allow shareholders to choose whether to empower their firm's directors
to use antitakeover devices.
Finally, there is a strong argument that a company that adopts a
128. DEL. CODEANN. fit. 8, § 109(b) (emphasis added).
129. As one Delaware court has stated:
[W]hether the [stockholder] vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or
as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory that legiti-
mates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of
property that they do not own. Thus, when viewed from a broad, institutional perspec-
five, it can be seen that matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process
involve consideration not present in any other context in which directors exercise dele-
gated power.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
130. See DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 203(a).
131. See ROE, supra note 3, at 161.
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shareholder rights bylaw is still managed under the direction of its board
anyway. After all, the board still has full power to recommend that
shareholders reject an outside bid and firms with rights bylaws still have
power to recommend that shareholders vote to retain a poison pill even
after a rights bylaw has been enacted.'32 The shareholder rights bylaw
can reasonably be characterized as a corporate governance mechanism
as opposed to a means for allowing shareholders to make business de-
cisions. As Coffee describes:
[T]he bylaws are the appropriate location for constraints that limit the
exercise of corporate power, including by the directors. The key dis-
tinction then seems to be between affirmative instructions to take spe-
cific actions (which generally seem impermissible) and negative con-
straints that affect the allocation of power between the board and the
shareholders (which generally seem permissible).'33
Alternatively stated, limitations on poison pills, like the share-
holder rights bylaw, present "no threat to the board's agenda control...
but respects shareholders' residual governance authority" because the
pill "may be categorized as a residual governance mechanism over
which the shareholders have reserve authority through a bylaw amend-
ment.," 4
Even if the governance/agenda line is not completely bright, the
shareholder rights bylaw weighs heavier on the governance side. All
bylaws interfere to some extent with directors' unfettered power to run
the firm. There must be some space on the legal landscape for share-
holder democracy, a concept regularly protected in corporate law.'35
In fact, the Delaware courts have recognized that legitimate bylaws
will sometimes limit director control over management. In Frantz
Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries,'36 the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld a series of bylaws which prohibited a board of directors from is-
suing stock to an employee stock ownership plan, a measure which
could have been used to dilute the power of a stockholder who, absent
132. In Blasius, the Delaware Chancery Court recognized this type of distinction when it
wrote that "there is a vast difference between expending corporate funds to inform the electorate
and exercising power for the primary purpose of foreclosing effective shareholder action." Blasius,
564 A.2d at 663.
133. Coffee, supra note 4, at 608.
134. Gordon, An Essay for Warren Buffett, supra note 50, at 549.
135. For an extensive list of examples of Delaware cases in which the principles of share-
holder democracy are protected, see Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 n.2.
136. 501 A.2d401,409 (Del. 1985).
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the issuance, gains a controlling share of the corporation. '37 It is difficult
to distinguish this bylaw, essentially functioning as an anti-antitakeover
device, from bylaws limiting the discretion to use a poison pill. Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit agreed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") when it recognized that, under Delaware law, share-
holders can legally pass bylaws requiring independent auditors. 8 This
precedent also supports the proposition that bylaws may limit the mana-
gerial powers of the board of directors. In other words, the board's
managerial power is not absolute and may be affected by actions pursu-
ant to section 109(b).
In Carmody v. Toll Brothers,'39 the Delaware Court of Chancery
held that a shareholder rights plan with a "deadhand" feature, providing
that it could not be redeemed except by the incumbent directors who
adopted the plan or their designated representatives, was subject to
challenge for violating various statutory and fiduciary requirements of
Delaware law. The provisions in the plaintiff's complaint that deadhand
pills are invalid because they violated the provisions of Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law section 141(a) are of particular relevance for the
present analysis of shareholder rights bylaws. In Carmody, the com-
plaining shareholders argued that the deadhand pill impermissibly inter-
fered with the directors' power to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation by unlawfully transferring power from the firm's current
directors to the directors that enacted the original deadhand pill. How-
ever, unlike the situation with a deadhand poison pill, a shareholder
rights bylaw is implemented with a shareholder vote. There is a clear
and obvious distinction between a shareholders' action that allocates
power between shareholders and directors, and the action by a firm's
board of directors that deprives future directors of the ability to manage
the firm. Also, the Delaware Court of Chancery seemed particularly
concerned that not even a vote to replace all of a farm's board of direc-
tors could invalidate a deadhand pill without the permission of the con-
tinuing directors. By contrast, a shareholder rights bylaw could be en-
acted that permitted a committee of current directors, or a single
director, to keep a firm's defensive devices in place. Finally, unlike the
situation with the deadhand poison pill in Carmody, the shareholder
rights bylaw provides for a prompt shareholder vote to validate the
137. See id.
138. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511,517 (3d Cir. 1947); see also Burr v. Burr
Corp., 291 A.2d 409, 412 (Del. Ch. 1972) (validating shareholder bylaws altering the composition
of the board of directors and giving them special powers).
139. C.A. No. 15983, 1998 WL418896, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1998).
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provisions of the bylaw. The shareholders are free at that time to restore
the board's prerogatives to engage in defensive tactics.
The directors' power to manage a firm depends on the definition of
the firm. Integral to that definition is the relationship between the share-
holders and the board. As one Delaware court has stated, "[t]he share-
holder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legiti-
macy of directorial power rests."'4° The power given to shareholders to
amend the bylaws of a firm recognizes the shareholders' contractual
power to define the nature of the firm. Adopting a shareholder rights
bylaw is merely an exercise of that definitional power.
CONCLUSION
The shareholder rights bylaw should be upheld in order to protect
shareholder interests in takeover actions. Absent such a provision,
challenging the use of a poison pill is almost impossible in light of ju-
dicial restraint in the face of business judgment matters. Moreover,
waging a proxy battle to remove a board using a poison pill is an uncer-
tain and expensive measure, taking up to two years to revoke the poison
pill and approve a merger by gaining control of the board.
1 41
The meta-rule at work is that the firm exists to maximize share-
holder value. A board of directors has a responsibility to this concept of
the firm. As observed earlier, one of the reasons shareholders may find
it in their interests to give their agents the authority to use a poison pill
is that these devices inhibit two-tier tender offers that place the stock-
holders in a "prisoner's dilemma." The dilemma prevents stockholders
from realizing the full value of their shares in a corporate control trans-
action. Thus, retaining the option of the poison pill for firms grants
boards a powerful tool for ensuring that shareholder value is maximized
in contests for corporate control. Adding the shareholder rights bylaw
gives the shareholders a means for holding boards accountable in their
use of the pill. The combination of the pill and the bylaw maintains the
option to obtain benefits from the poison pill while controlling the
abuses inherent in the power to use such pills. Finns-and state func-
tionaries such as legislatures and judges-that ignore this point do so at
their own peril.
The shareholder rights bylaw already won an important victory
when the SEC began requiring that these bylaws, when proposed, must
140. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
141. See Osterland, supra note 8, at 38.
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be included in corporate proxy solicitations under SEC rule 14a-8.
The SEC has set the stage for a major legal battle. The battle will sur-
face when shareholders approve a proposed shareholder rights bylaw,
and the bylaw is then challenged in court by incumbent directors
claiming that their "right" to run the company is being usurped. If
Delaware judges refuse to respect the rights of these shareholders, it is
likely that institutional investors will begin demanding that their firms
reincorporate in jurisdictions offering shareholders greater protection.
142. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997) (empowering the board to exclude 13 categories of
proposals from proxy statements); see also Goodchild & Buzzetta, supra note 96, at 6 (explaining
how the SEC refused to allow the exclusion of a bylaw proposal where a stockholder relied upon
Fleming).
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